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Previous studies of associative learning implicate higher-level cog-
nitive processes in some forms of classical conditioning. An ongo-
ing debate is concerned with the extent to which attention and
awareness are necessary for trace but not delay eye-blink condi-
tioning [Clark, R. E. & Squire, L. R. (1998) Science 280, 77–81;
Lovibond, P. F. & Shanks, D. (2002) J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav.
Processes 28, 38–42]. In trace conditioning, a short interval is
interposed between the termination of the conditioned stimulus
(CS) and the onset of the unconditioned stimulus (US). In delay
conditioning, the CS and US overlap. We here investigate the
extent to which human classical fear conditioning depends on
working memory. Subjects had to carry out an n-back task, requir-
ing tracking an item 1 or 2 back in a sequentially presented list of
numbers, while simultaneously being tested for their ability to
associate auditory cues with shocks under a variety of conditions
(single-cue versus differential; delay versus trace; no task versus 0-,
1-, and 2-back). Differential delay conditioning proved to be more
resilient than differential trace conditioning but does show a
reduction due to task interference similar in slope to that found in
trace conditioning. Explicit knowledge of the stimulus contingency
facilitates but does not guarantee trace conditioning. Only the
single-cue delay protocol shows conditioning during the more
difficult working memory task. Our findings suggest that the larger
the cognitive demands on the system, the less likely conditioning
occurs. A postexperimental questionnaire showed a positive cor-
relation between conditioning and awareness for differential trace
conditioning extinction.
Pavlovian conditioning is widely used to study associativelearning in species ranging from mollusks to flies, rodents,
monkeys, and humans (1–10). This form of learning involves the
association of an initially neutral stimulus, the conditioned
stimulus (CS), with a correlated meaningful stimulus, the un-
conditioned stimulus (US). An unresolved question concerns the
extent to which certain forms of classical conditioning depend on
higher-level cognitive processes, including selective attention,
working memory, and awareness (11–17). Eye-blink condition-
ing is an associative learning paradigm where the role of explicit
knowledgeawareness is being investigated. The paradigm in-
volves the association of an eye blink (a somatic motor response)
with a previously meaningless stimuli (CS).
Recent data showed that, in humans, associative trace condi-
tioning of eye-blink responses requires awareness of the contin-
gency between the CS (a tone) and the US (a puff of air to the
eye), whereas this is not the case for delay conditioning (11,
18–20). In delay conditioning, the start of the US is temporally
contiguous with the CS, whereas in trace conditioning, an
interval is interposed between the end of the CS and the start of
the US. Distracting subjects by having them perform a secondary
task (for example, a verbal shadowing task) during a trace
procedure prevents conditioning. Furthermore, subjects’ ability
to report the exact nature of the CSUS relationship (e.g., ‘‘I
believe the tone came before the airpuff’’) is greatly impaired
with concurrent distraction during trace conditioning. Con-
versely, associative delay conditioning appears to be insensitive
to distractors. Other experiments find that both trace and delay
associative differential conditioning can be disrupted by tasks
that demand sufficient attention, whereas this is not the case for
single-cue conditioning paradigms (16, 17). In single-cue con-
ditioning, only one CS is presented (paired with the US). In
differential conditioning, two CSs are presented, one of which is
correlated with US presentations (CS), whereas the other is not
(CS).
We chose fear conditioning to replicate and extend these
findings with human subjects on the basis of a conditioning
protocol easily extendable to mice, animals for which well
established molecular tools are available to manipulate geneti-
cally identifiable cell populations. Fear conditioning differs from
eye-blink conditioning in its underlying neuronal implementa-
tion, due in part to the fact that the association involves an
autonomic rather than a somatic motor response. Fear condi-
tioning is easy to obtain in humans and rodents, is acquired in
a fraction of the trials needed for eye-blink conditioning, and is
tolerant to long trace periods, making it amenable to functional
MRI investigations (21–24). Finally, the neural circuits under-
lying fear conditioning, in particular the lateral nucleus of the
amygdala, hippocampus and prefrontal cortex, are being vigor-
ously explored (25, 26). We use transient elevations in skin
conductance [skin conductance response (SCR)] as our measure
of autonomic arousal when testing responses to auditory stimuli
which have been previously paired with a shock. At the same
time, we distract our subjects with tasks of variable working
memory load. We are engaged in a parallel effort to reproduce
selected aspects of this work in mice (27).
Materials and Methods
Equipment. Conditioning stimuli were presented and SCRs were
recorded by using equipment from Contact Precision Instru-
ments (www.psylab.com) controlled by PSYLAB software. Silver
Silver Chloride electrodes filled with Med Associates paste
TD-246 were used for shock presentation and recording skin
conductance. CS presentations were mixed into stereo head-
phones. Distracting tasks were written in MATLAB (Mathworks,
Natick, MA) by using the PSYCHOPHYSICS TOOLBOX (28). Anal-
ysis was carried out by using programs written in MATLAB as well
as SPSS 10.
Subjects. Subjects were recruited from the California Institute of
Technology and were paid $20 for their participation, based on
informed consent. Their ages ranged from 18 to 31 years, with
a mean of 21 years. The following uninformed differential
conditioning groups consisted of six subjects each: (i) delay no
task; (ii) delay 1-back; (iii) delay 2-back; (iv) trace no task; (v)
trace 1-back; and (vi) trace 2-back. The following single-cue
conditioning groups consisted of four subjects each: (i) delay no
task; (ii) delay 2-back; (iii) uninformed trace no task; (iv)
uninformed trace 0-back; (v) uninformed trace 2-back; (vi)
informed trace no task; (vii) informed trace 0-back; and (viii)
informed trace 2-back.
Procedure. Skin-conductance electrodes were attached to the
palmar surface of the second phalanx of the first and second
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fingers of the nondominant hand. Shocking electrodes were
attached to the palmar surface of the third and fourth fingers of
the dominant hand. Each individual’s shock level was deter-
mined using a subjective rating protocol looking for a level that
was ‘‘uncomfortable but not painful.’’ This shock level was used
throughout the experiment.
After determining their shock level, subjects completed task
training, the third of three sessions of 5 min to ensure the
subject has reached plateau performance. Before conditioning,
subjects were read instructions asking them to focus on either
their visual task or the wall in front of them. Naive subjects had
no previous specific knowledge of the experiment except that it
was a ‘‘. . . learning and memory experiment that involves electric
shocks.’’ Instructions were read to subjects in the informed
groups; the instructions explicitly stated that an ‘‘electric shock
shortly follows most presentations of a tone’’ and that ‘‘the tone
generally predicts the occurrence of the electric shock.’’ The
subjects were asked to confirm verbally that they ‘‘understand
that the tone usually predicts the occurrence of the electric
shock.’’ Subjects were given a postexperimental questionnaire to
assess their knowledge of the CSUS relationship, similar to that
used in ref. 11, and were debriefed. The questionnaire for
differential conditioning included 17 questions to assess the
subject’s explicit knowledge of stimulus relationships. Subjects
were not allowed to correct previous answers. The awareness
index is a number between 0 and 17, corresponding to the
number of correct responses. The higher the index, the more
detailed the subject’s ability to recall the presence or absence of
a contingency relationship between stimuli.
The informed consent procedure was reviewed and approved
by the California Institute of Technology committee for the
protection of human subjects.
Conditioning Stimuli (Fig. 1A). The US used in these experiments
was a 0.25-sec-long 60-Hz AC shock whose amplitude was
determined by each subject. During differential conditioning,
the CS and CS were balanced between a 2-kHz tone (83 dB)
or white noise (72 dB) and were always 1 sec in length. The 2-kHz
tone was always used as the CS during single-cue conditioning.
During delay conditioning, reinforced CS presentations co-
terminated with the US. Reinforced CS presentations during
trace conditioning were followed by a shock 4 sec after the CS
onset (leaving a 3-sec trace period).
Experimental Phases (Fig. 1B). The learning procedure consisted of
three phases: habituation, acquisition, and extinction. In the first
phase, habituation, subjects received two presentations of the
CS and two of the CS, in that order, to familiarize them with
both stimuli. During acquisition, subjects received 24 CS and 24
CS presentations, a total of 48 trials. Twenty of the 24 CS
presentations were reinforced with a US, whereas four were not
reinforced to allow conditioning assessment. These four stimuli
were positioned by randomly removing the US after one of the
six CS presentations in each of the four blocks of 12 trials (six
CS, six CS) during acquisition (excluding the first two
CSUS pairings in the experiment). During the extinction
phase, subjects received 12 nonreinforced CS and 12 CS
presentations. CSCS presentations occurred in random or-
der, with the limiting factors being that no more than two
presentations of a specific CS occurred in a row and that six of
each occurred in each block of 12 trials. Intertrial intervals were
uniformly distributed from 15 to 25 sec.
Single-cue conditioning experiments were performed in a
similar fashion by using a phantom CS, marked periods of time
that had no actual stimuli instead of an explicitly unpaired
stimulus. The analysis protocol for single-cue conditioning was
analogous to the differential protocol by using these phantom
CSs. Although when compared with a US-only control method,
our procedure has the disadvantage of not controlling for
unassociated stimulus SCR, it has several advantages. It allows
a within-subject comparison, a more effective means of detecting
conditioning. This method also avoids the pitfalls of using a
US-only protocol where the USCS relationship is randomized
or explicitly unpaired. The former may be associated with
elevated CS responses due to a generally elevated anxiety level.
The latter tests the subject’s ability to learn the anticorrelated
relationship between the CS and US to enable suppression of the
aforementioned general anxiety. It should be noted that our
results show working memory tasks interfere with our single-cue
trace conditioning protocol, adding validity to the idea that using
the phantom CS allows accurate and sensitive detection of
conditioning.
Distracting Tasks (Fig. 1C). To confirm that the conditioning
protocols were effective, a group of subjects was not asked to
perform a task (i.e., to simply stare at the wall) for each
procedure. The degree to which conditioning depends on work-
ing memory was assessed by asking a group of subjects to
perform an n-back memory task during a conditioning proce-
dure. Subjects had to press a key every time a given number
appeared (0-back), when the present number matched the one
before it (1-back), or when it was identical to the one before the
previous one (2-back). Only single-cue trace subjects were asked
to perform the 0-back task. The 0-back task involves the same
input and the same motor output, including frequency of re-
sponse, as the 1- and 2-back tasks but depends only minimally on
working memory.
The numeral 1, 2, 3, or 4 appeared at a constant rate that, for
a 2-back task, was adjusted for each subject to achieve a
performance of 85%. The mean rate of 2-back presentation
was 1 Hz for differential subjects (88% correct), 1.33 Hz for
uninformed single-cue subjects (84% correct), and 1.2 Hz for
informed single-cue subjects (85% correct). All 1- and 0-back
tasks were performed at a presentation rate of 1.33 Hz. The
mean performance for subjects focusing on the 1-back task was
93.5%. The mean task performance for single-cue subjects in the
0-back group was 98% for uninformed subjects and 99% for
informed subjects.
Fig. 1. (A) Delay conditioning consisted of a 0.25-sec-long electric shock that
overlapped and coterminated with the 1-sec-long CS (tone or noise). In trace
conditioning, the CSwas followed 3 sec later by the US. (B) The conditioning
protocol consisted of three phases: habituation, acquisition, and extinction.
(C) Distraction tasks and conditioning procedures were performed concur-
rently. During a 0-back task, the subject pressed a key (marked by an X)
whenever a predetermined number appeared (4 in this case). During a 1- or
2-back task, the subject pressed a key whenever the number matched the one
before it or the one before the previous one, respectively.
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Analysis of SCR. A skin-conductance response was measured as
the maximal amplitude difference of more than 10 nS that
occurred in a 1- to 4-sec window after the delay CS onset or in
a 1- to 7-sec window after the trace CS onset. Valid responses
were range-corrected by the largest-amplitude response for each
subject (29). When there was no response, a 0-amplitude re-
sponse was included in the analysis.
Habituation analysis was performed for differential condi-
tioning by using a paired t test and a normalized ANOVA. No
significant SCR differences were observed between the CSs,
with one exception. Only the differential delay group performing
no task showed a SCR difference (P  0.05) using the normal-
ized ANOVA. However, no difference was observed by using the
paired t test. The discrepancy between these statistical tests, the
robustness of the conditioning for this group, and the biased
presentation order of the CSs led us to regard this difference as
inconsequential.
All CS presentations were compared with adjacent CS
presentations. During acquisition, when there were two adjacent
CS presentations available for comparison to a CS, one was
chosen at random.
Reported P values for conditioning were ranked F statistics for
bootstrapped ANOVAs (105 resamples per test). Four other tests
were performed for confirmation: ranked F statistics for a
permuted ANOVA (105 resamples); a square-root-corrected
ANOVA; a permutation test (30) (105 resamples); and a paired
t test (averaging each trial across subjects). These confirmation
statistics yielded similar results with the exceptions noted below.
Differential awareness correlations used a least-squares fit.
Analysis of main factors and interactions were performed by
using the General Linear Model univariate ANOVA in SPSS
(Ver. 10, Macintosh). These tests used the mean CSCS
difference for each subject.
Trial Effects. Trial effects were analyzed overall for acquisition
and extinction phases of the experiment to assess the possible
presence of consistent trends, such as a gambler’s fallacy effect.
Whether conditioning has occurred is assessed by comparing the
results of the habituation analysis to the results of the acquisi-
tionextinction phases of the experiment. In general, no CS
CS (or phantom CS) difference is present during habituation.
There is a significant difference (P  0.05) between CS and
CS (or phantom CS) responses during acquisition and extinc-
tion when conditioning has occurred. Learning is then demon-
strated by the presence of this difference (reported in the results
below).
Results
Differential Conditioning. No task. Differential conditioning rela-
tionships were first established for trace and delay paradigms, by
using six subjects per group asked to perform no task during
conditioning. The delay group (Fig. 2A) shows larger SCRs to
the CS test trials than to adjacent CS presentations (P 
0.001). The same is true of SCRs during trace conditioning (Fig.
2B, P 0.001; paired t test, P 0.01). No significant trial effects
are present in either group. Thus, trace and delay differential
protocols are sufficient to produce conditioning when per-
formed alone, without distraction.
Concurrent distracting task. The n-back working memory task
served as a distraction from the concurrently performed condi-
tioning protocol. When six subjects performed the 1-back work-
ing memory task during differential delay conditioning (Fig. 2C),
there is a statistically significant difference between responses to
CS and CS during conditioning (P  0.01). However, when a
1-back working memory task was performed by six subjects
during differential trace conditioning, there is no significant
difference between SCRs to CS and SCRs to CS (Fig. 2D).
When subjects carried out the 2-back task, there is no significant
difference between responses to CS and CS for either delay
(n  6) or trace (n  6) conditioning (Fig. 2 E and F). No
significant trial effects are present.
Differential main effects. A univariate ANOVA using the mean
CSCS differences for each subject showed that both the
delaytrace difference and task level were significant main
effects (P 0.05 and P 0.01, respectively). The delaytrace by
task interaction was not significant but may have been lost in the
floor effect between differential trace 1-back and differential
trace 2-back.
Awareness of CSUS Contingency. Correlations between awareness and
CSCS amplitude differences. There is a positive correlation
between the awareness index and strength of conditioning
(mean [CS  CS]) during extinction for the 18 subjects
carrying out the differential trace learning procedure (Fig. 3).
The correlation has an adjusted r2 value of 0.334 (Pearson
coefficient 0.611, P 0.01). No significant correlations between
contingency awareness and CSCS difference are present for
trace acquisition or for either acquisition or extinction during delay
conditioning.
Differential conditioning task interference. The 12 subjects who were
not performing a task during differential conditioning (six delay,
six trace) have an average awareness index of 15.2 (maximum
17). Twenty-four subjects who were performing a task during
Fig. 2. Mean range-corrected SCRs to CS presentations for each trial. Thirty-
six subjects (six per group) participated in either the differential delay (A, C, or
E) or trace (B, D, or F) learning procedure without any task or while being
distracted by a 1- or a 2-back task. Mean range-corrected SCRs to CS are
shown in solid lines with cross markers. Mean range-corrected SCRs to CS are
indicated by dashed lines with circles. Significant conditioning exists during
the delay procedure with no concurrent task and while performing the 1-back
task. Only under the no-task condition did we find significant trace condi-
tioning. The vertical line marks the last test trial during the acquisition phase.








differential conditioning (trace and delay, 1- and 2-back, six
subjects in each combination of conditions) have an average
index of 13.4. A univariate ANOVA using the awareness ques-
tionnaire score to test factors that influence awareness shows
significant main effects for both task (P  0.05) and delaytrace
(delay mean  14.8, trace mean  13.2, P  0.05) with no
significant interaction. In summary, the addition of both a task
and a short trace interval reduces the subject’s ability to report
the CSUS contingency relationship in a postexperimental
questionnaire. Single-Cue Conditioning. No task. Single-cue conditioning relation-
ships were established in a group of four delay subjects and four
trace subjects who did not perform any distracting task during
the conditioning protocol. Both groups (Fig. 4 A and B, respec-
tively, n 4 each) show significant differences between CS test
trials and adjacent phantom CS presentations (P  0.001). No
significant trial effects are present.
Concurrent distracting task. A group of four single-cue delay sub-
jects and a group of four single-cue trace subjects were asked to
focus on the 2-back working memory task during conditioning
(Fig. 4 C and D, respectively). The subjects that carried out the
2-back task during single-cue delay conditioning show greater
SCRs to CS test trials than to phantom CS trials (P  0.001).
The four subjects performing the same 2-back task during a trace
conditioning protocol show no significant conditioning for the
experiment. No significant trial effects are present. Although the
2-back task interferes with single-cue trace (Fig. 4D) and dif-
ferential delay conditioning (Fig. 2E), there is still a significant
CS difference in single-cue delay conditioning during the 2-back
task.
Uninformed 0-back task. A group of four subjects had to signal
whenever a particular number appeared on the screen (0-back)
during the single-cue trace conditioning procedure (Fig. 5A).
There is no statistically significant difference between responses
to the CS and the phantom CS for this group. No significant
trial effects are present. Although the 0-back task is a simple
signal-detection task, there is no significant CS difference during
single-cue trace conditioning.
Informed subjects. For the group of four informed subjects not
distracted by any additional task (Fig. 5B) and for the four
performing the 0-back task (Fig. 5C), there are significant
differences between responses to the CS and the phantom CS
during single-cue trace conditioning (P  0.001). However, for
Fig. 4. Mean range-corrected SCRs to CS presentations for each trial. Sixteen
subjects (four per group) participated in either single-cue delay (A or C) or
trace (B or D) conditioning without any distraction or while carrying out a
2-back task. Mean range-corrected SCRs to CS are shown in solid lines with
cross markers. Mean range-corrected SCRs to marked phantom CS time
points are indicated by dashed lines with circles. Significant conditioning exists
for delay conditioning with no concurrent task and while performing the
2-back task. Significant trace conditioning is present only while no task
is performed. The vertical line marks the last test trial presented during
acquisition.
Fig. 5. Mean range-corrected SCRs to CS presentations for each trial. Sixteen
subjects (four per group) participated in either informed or uninformed
single-cue trace conditioning without being distracted (no task) or while
carrying out a 0- or a 2-back task. Mean range-corrected SCRs to CSare shown
in solid lines with cross markers. Mean range-corrected SCRs to marked
phantom CS time points are indicated by dashed lines with circles. Significant
conditioning is present for informed trace conditioning while subjects per-
formed no task or a 0-back task. Significant uninformed trace conditioning is
present only without a concurrent task (Fig. 2B). The vertical line marks the last
test trial presented during acquisition.
Fig. 3. Scatter plot of mean range-corrected differences between CS and
CS and the subject’s awareness index. During differential trace extinction
(Fig. 2 B, D, and F; trials 5–16), subjects show a linearly increasing relationship
between average amplitude of response difference and postexperimental
questionnaire score (adjusted r20.334, Pearson coefficient0.611, P0.01,
n  18). Subjects show no significant correlation between conditioning
(average range-corrected CS to CS) and awareness index during diffe-
rential trace acquisition, differential delay acquisition, or differential delay
extinction.
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the group of four informed subjects performing the 2-back task
(Fig. 5D), there are no significant differences between responses
to the CS and the phantom CS. No significant trial effects are
present in any group. Prior explicit knowledge of the stimulus
contingency facilitates but does not guarantee single-cue trace
conditioning.
Discussion
It is generally held in both eye-blink and fear conditioning that
acquired trace and delay CSUS associations are distinct forms
of learning. Although the key difference between the two is the
interposition of a temporal gap between the end of the CS and
the start of the US, they involve different neural circuits and obey
different regularities. For instance, acquisition of trace but not
delay conditioning depends critically on hippocampus and cer-
tain prefrontal structures (31–36). In addition, Clark and Squire
(11) showed that differential trace eye-blink conditioning de-
pends on CSUS contingency awareness, whereas this is not the
case for delay conditioning (see also refs. 20, 37, and 38). This
claim has been challenged. For example, Carrillo et al. (16)
demonstrated that not only single-cue delay but also single-cue
trace conditioning was unaffected by division of attention. They
used a dual-task paradigm to study the ability of subjects to
acquire eye-blink conditioning while their attention is concur-
rently engaged by watching a silent movie or verbal shadowing.
Differential delay conditioning, however, is affected by the
division of attention. Therefore, Carrillo et al. argue that the
additional attentional demands imposed by the need to discrim-
inate CS from CS prevent delay conditioning from occurring
when subjects have to perform a second task (see also refs. 17
and 39, and above results).
In this paper, we present experiments on fear conditioning.
Fear conditioning differs from eye-blink conditioning in that it
depends on the amygdala for both delay and trace conditioning,
whereas eye-blink conditioning shows a similar pattern of de-
pendence on the cerebellum (26). Our experimental paradigm
involves association between tones or noises as CSs and electric
shocks as USs. As a measure of autonomic conditioning, we use
increases in skin conductance in a comparatively young popu-
lation (college students). We choose fear conditioning because
it can easily be adapted to rodents, allowing the use of molecular
and genetic tools to study the underlying neuronal substrates of
conditioning.
The general pattern of our findings is that the extent of
associative autonomic conditioning depends on the cognitive
load involved. The larger the demands on the system, the less
conditioning occurs. We use the mean CSCS difference for
each group as a measure of strength of conditioning. This
measure of conditioning is plotted in Fig. 6 for each of our
experiments. Fig. 6 represents the transition from uninformed
differential (Fig. 6A) to uninformed single cue (Fig. 6B, remov-
ing the second anticorrelated CS), and then the addition of
explicit knowledge of the CSUS relationship in the informed
single-cue condition (Fig. 6C). Task difficulty increases from left
to right on the horizontal axis. The axis into the plane of the
paper separates the trace and delay groups by the stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) between the CS and US (trace SOA  4 s,
delay SOA  0.75 s). Moving in Fig. 6 from bottom to top (Fig.
6 C to A), from left to right, or out of the plane of the paper all
result in an increase in overall conditioning complexity for the
subject. Moving in any of these directions, away from the origin,
the plotted measure of conditioning decreases, supporting the
hypothesis that as conditioning complexity increases, the ampli-
tudeprobability of conditioning decreases. This is reflected in
a univariate ANOVA, where the main effects singledifferential,
delaytrace, task level, and informeduninformed are all signif-
icant. The only significant interaction is between single
differential and delaytrace. The lack of a significant delaytrace
task effect could be due to a floor effect, because the condi-
tioning amplitude has reached zero for trace conditioning
protocols in the first level where a concurrent task has been
added. We are not making any claims about the uniqueness
of this representation. Others are possible and might prove
advantageous.
It should be noted that Fig. 6 is compatible with the existence
of secondary tasks that do not interfere with trace conditioning
in naive subjects. A similar plot might also prove beneficial in
summarizing the eye-blink conditioning literature.
In Fig. 6, there are several interesting points to note. First,
similar to results shown by others in eye-blink conditioning (16,
17, 39), differential delay conditioning is susceptible to inter-
ference tasks. Second, it should be noted that although reduced,
single-cue delay conditioning still occurred during the difficult
2-back task. Third, all of the distracting tasks tested so far
interfere with the trace fear conditioning protocol in our naive
subject pool. This is even the case for the 0-back task under
single-cue trace conditioning, a simple signal detection task,
pressing a button whenever the target appeared in a string of
numbers, with minimal attentional and working memory de-
mands (subjects had to remember only a single target number
during the 20-min conditioning procedure). Fourth, it is only
when we briefed subjects ahead of time about the nature of the
Fig. 6. Summary of our data plotted in a 3D space capturing the contingen-
cies of our protocol. The vertical axis marks the group average for each
subject’s average range-corrected and normalized CSCS difference. The
horizontal axis marks the task difficulty. The axis into the plane of the paper
marks the group as trace or delay using the difference in CSUS onset (stimulus
onset asynchrony, SOA) in seconds. In addition, the line for trace is hatched,
whereas the line for the delay group is solid. **, significant conditioning at
P 0.01. Areas of the lines that are not filled in are meant to assist the stability
of the figure, not to imply any prediction about the magnitude of condition-
ing in that area. (A) Mean group differences for differential subjects. (B) Mean
group differences for uninformed single-cue subjects. (C) Mean group differ-
ences for single-cue informed subjects. Our results indicate the higher the
cognitive load, the smaller the CSCS difference.








experiment that we could reliably induce trace conditioning
under a 0-back task. We conjecture that providing this infor-
mation focused their attention onto the CSUS relationship and
boosted learning.
The evaluation of the postexperimental questionnaire showed
a correlation (r2  0.395) between differential trace subjects’
awareness scores and conditioning during the extinction phase.
We found no significant correlation in the acquisition phase, nor
did we find a correlation for either phase of delay conditioning.
The correlation found establishes a link between explicit knowl-
edge of the CSUS relationship and the expression of trace fear
conditioning during extinction. It is different from the explicit
knowledgeconditioning correlations reported in ref. 11, be-
cause our correlation occurs in fear conditioning and is true for
the extinction phase as opposed to acquisition. A challenge for
the future will be to develop on-line measures of CSUS
contingency awareness (12, 40).
One might expect that subjects who are aware of the stimulus
contingency would show a gambler’s fallacy effect, where the
differential response amplitude during extinction phase in-
creases for a number of extinction trials. Such a pattern was
reported during eye-blink conditioning (37). We failed to find
any significant trend in response slope. In fact, it is likely that if
higher awareness scores cause stronger conditioning, this may
lead to more than one response strategy (for example, higher
initial responses with rapid extinction or gambler’s fallacy). Our
results also show a reduction in awareness in those groups who
were performing a task compared with the no-task controls.
Two possible nonexclusive explanations for our results are the
following. (i) Explicit knowledge of the CSUS relationship is
necessary for the expression of more complex types of condi-
tioning. When that explicit knowledge cannot be acquired,
conditioning cannot be established. This is supported by the fact
that task performance reduces both the awareness index and the
efficacy of differential conditioning. In addition, explicit prior
knowledge of the CSUS relationship compensates for some of
the interference in single-cue trace conditioning caused by
concurrent task performance. (ii) It is possible that concurrent
task performance suppresses amygdala activity and therefore the
establishment of a conditioned fear response. Medial prefrontal
cortex stimulation in rodents shows suppression of the basolat-
eral complex of the amygdala (41). Furthermore, the n-back task
shows increased brain activity, as assayed by fMRI, in human
prefrontal areas that could be linked to suppression of normal
brain activity under adverse conditions (42). Either of these
observations could explain fear conditioning interference by
concurrent task performance. Our ongoing investigations of
associative fear conditioning in both mice and people using
various distracting tasks should prove useful in better under-
standing conditioning and its neuronal basis.
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